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Are the agglomeration economies of technology hubs augmented by a localized market for 
start-ups – acquisitions, and IPOs? How does this affect the ability of places outside of those 
hubs to foster digital startups as a tool of local economic development? 
We study this with a particular focus on acquisitions by the seven largest American digital 
platforms – Amazon, Alphabet [Google], Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Oracle and Adobe, which 
we call, collectively, Big Tech. We cover the years 2001-2020. 
We show that firms acquired by Big Tech are, disproportionately to the sectors in which they 
operate, concentrated in major tech clusters, and particularly in the Silicon Valley (San 
Francisco/San Jose). Foreign acquisitions by Big Tech also show a marked concentration in a 
few countries, and particular places in those countries. NASDAQ IPOs of firms in relevant 
sectors are similarly concentrated. 
Acquisition, or the less common alternative, IPO, is the second major phase of financing for a 
digital start up. The first phase is commonly associated with venture capital (VC), and location 
proximate to venture capital companies has often been seen as a motivation for locating in a tech 
cluster. We find, however, that neither VC funding, nor funding an investor located in the Silicon 
Valley, predicts either acquisition by Big Tech, or IPO. Funding by any of the VCs that helped 
launch the Big Tech firms, however, is strongly associated with Big Tech acquisition. This 
suggests an important role for social networks in both the first and second phases of financing, 
but not necessarily a geographical role in the first phase.  
We argue that the acquisition market – and its effects on both the major tech hubs and the left 
behind rest – depends crucially on the proprietary control of access to various digital network 
products. Regulation of these markets, particularly in the form of common carrier status and 
open standards, could achieve a considerable re-balancing. 
 
Keywords: tech giants, market power, start-ups, acquisitions, regional inequality 
JEL Classification: L1, O3, R12 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are extremely grateful to Cameron Baird for her outstanding research assistance.  The usual 





Digital start-ups are often seen as a promising vehicle for local economic development, 
yet as they become established many are pulled away to relocate in major tech clusters. This 
locational choice is often treated as being explained by agglomeration economies which boost 
the productivity of tech workers (Duranton and Puga 2004; Nathan 2015; Adler et al. 2019; 
Gazel and Schwienbacher 2020); others have pointed, additionally, to proximity to venture 
capital financing (Kenney 2011; Florida and Mellander 2016). It contributes to the growing gulf 
between prosperous tech clusters and “left behind” places – a gulf seen in incomes, housing 
prices, age profiles, education levels and voting behavior – which has become central to our 
understanding of social and political polarization (Rodriguez-Pose 2018; Iammarino, Rodríguez-
Pose, and Storper 2019; Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2020). 
We argue that one important factor in many digital start-ups’ choice to locate in major 
tech hubs – and the Silicon Valley in particular – is that proximity to the largest digital firms 
makes it more likely that the start-up will be acquired by one of the latter. We study acquisitions 
by the seven largest American digital platforms – Amazon, Alphabet [Google], Apple, 
Microsoft, Facebook, Oracle and Adobe (we refer to these collectively as Big Tech). As others 
have shown (see e.g. Rikap and Lundvall 2020), acquisition of smaller companies is, for Big 
Tech, a major source of new technologies, ideas and talent. The ability of Big Tech to exploit the 
monopoly power conferred by positions in control of critical digital platforms has given these 
companies extraordinary financial resources; continuing acquisition of start-ups and, with them, 
new features and capabilities, both makes use of these financial resources, and extends and 
cements Big Tech’s control of its markets. 
The other side of the acquisition market – being acquired – is a critical part of the 
business model of digital start-ups. This is due to the scale economies – low marginal costs and 
network properties – of many digital products. Success – even survival – in markets for these 
products requires rapid scaling in order to secure a decisive, often winner-take-all, first mover 
advantage. Growth therefore requires substantial infusions of equity investment, which typically 
comes in two distinct stages. In the first, an investor such as a venture capitalist or business angel 
will take a large, often controlling, interest in the firm. In the second, part or all of the first-round 
stakes will be sold, either through a stock market flotation (initial public offering, or IPO), or 




start-up, but acquisition is far more common. Since many start-ups fail to reach the second round 
of financing, making it happen is an important business objective. 
In an earlier paper, we argued that the divide between wealthy and poor places is 
deepened by monopoly power, and in particular by the power of the large digital platform 
companies  (Feldman, Guy, and Iammarino 2020). Among the reasons we gave for this is that 
the power of these companies amplifies the centripetal pull of agglomeration economies. It does 
so for two reasons. One is that the productivity of labor is augmented by monopoly rents, some 
portion of which is shared in the form of high remuneration for a stratum of skilled workers. The 
other is that, for smaller digital firms, part of the attraction of major tech hubs is the market for 
acquisitions: proximity makes it more likely that a particular start-up will be chosen as the latest 
augmentation of a major digital platform, with the result that some sliver of the platform’s rents 
will be shared among the owners and key employees of the startup. In this paper, we develop the 
second of these claims, about the market for acquisitions. 
Why does it matter if the productivity-enhancing characteristics of a tech cluster – the 
familiar Marshallian properties – are being amplified by monopoly power? Simply, because the 
welfare implications of the two sources of agglomeration are different. If an agglomeration 
grows large and wealthy purely for Marshallian productivity reasons, then any efforts to 
redistribute benefits from that agglomeration to places left behind, must face the question of 
whether a spatially-targeted economic development policy may kill the goose that is laying 
golden eggs. But if the agglomeration has grown still larger and wealthier due to the monopoly 
power of firms based there, then familiar remedies such as anti-trust enforcement and regulation 
may mitigate both the problems typically associated with monopoly, and regional disparities in 
income and opportunity. 
In this paper, we develop evidence for the market for the acquisition of start-ups. Section 
2 places our main arguments in the literature. Section 3 provides data sources and descriptive 
evidence on the acquisitions. Section 4 describes our reference groups of companies in the same 
sectors. Section 5 presents regression analysis that supports the finding from the US descriptive 
statistics.  Section 6 discusses implications and concludes with future directions for research.   
 




Theories of cluster dynamics have often addressed the relationships between large and 
small firms (e.g. Feldman, Francis, and Bercovitz 2005; Feldman and Lowe 2015). It has been 
common to see large firms as anchors to a cluster, with smaller firms present to serve them, 
typically as suppliers, and with large firms connecting the cluster to distant markets and sources 
of knowledge. Such have variously been labelled hub-and-spoke cluster, solar cluster, or 
industrial complex serving the needs of larger client firms (Markusen 1996; Piore and Sabel 
1984; Gordon and McCann 2000). Small firms may also be clustered close to a large one 
because the small ones were founded by former employees (Klepper 2011; 2015). 
We are interested here in a different spatial dynamic between large and small firms: not a 
stable set of small suppliers to the large firms, nor small firms founded on exit from large ones, 
but a marketplace for acquisition of the small firms by the large firms.  
Start-ups may be drawn to tech clusters by productivity-enhancing agglomeration 
economies; by better access to financing for growth (we include being acquired as financing); or 
a combination of the two. Against these are factors encouraging digital start-ups to locate 
elsewhere. As Dahl and Sorenson (2012) show, entrepreneurs, even more than workers, prefer to 
grow their business in a place they already know – in other words, they would rather stay home 
(see also Florida and Hathaway 2018; Sorenson 2018). The product of the digital start-up seems 
well suited to this: it is weightless, something that in technical terms can be shipped anywhere in 
the world as easily as across the street; the infrastructure requirements for operating such a firm 
are easily satisfied in a developed country – a reliable broadband connection and electric power; 
state and local governments offer incentives to stay; and, while most places do not have the large 
pool of talent available in a major tech hub, skills of programming and software engineering are 
taught universally. Notably, programming skills are taught and researched at a high level in 
places such as Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, and Ann Arbor, Michigan, and dozens of other 
rustbelt or southern universities with fine engineering schools. Some of these places figure 
prominently in the world ranking of start-up hubs (Florida and Hathaway, 2018); yet, as we see 
below, these places are negligible as home bases for start-ups at the time of acquisition by 




Digital start-ups1 are likewise producing highly scalable products – sometimes tools or 
features to augment existing platforms, sometimes platforms on their own (e.g. Ruggieri et al. 
2018). The commercial logic of proprietary digital products is that they must be scaled, because a 
successful first mover will dominate a market segment (Schilling 2002). This winner-take-all 
market structure means that scaling must occur quickly, depriving digital firms of the option of 
organic growth from retained earnings: external financing is needed. Moreover, starting up in a 
winner-take-all market is very risky, so the external financing must be equity financing, from 
investors with pockets deep enough to sustain some years of losses at best and to lose all at 
worst. The same technological features which make unregulated proprietary platforms into 
monopolies thus drive small digital companies to prioritize relations with equity investors. In 
what we can call the venture capital stage, this investment typically comes in the form of private 
equity, often from a firm specializing in venture capital; sometimes, it will come from an 
individual “angel” investor (Kenney 2011; see also Table 4, below). Such equity investors 
habitually acquire controlling stakes in the company, and usually intend to sell the company at a 
later stage.  Sale may either entail the start-up being floated on the stock market in an initial 
public offering, or its acquisition by another firm. The IPO route comes with the prospect of 
wealth and fame for the founders as principals in an independent company; it is, however, by far 
the less common of the two routes. An acquisition by Big Tech is among the most lucrative 
outcomes (Dwoskin 2020).   
Guzman (2019) considers two competing explanations of US start-ups’ location – 
agglomeration economies and social embeddedness and concludes that agglomeration economies 
are far more important than social networks. He finds selection of high quality start-ups, 
particularly from lower agglomeration regions, into Silicon Valley, and shows that moving 
results – among other financial and market benefits – in a higher likelihood of being either 
acquired and offered an IPO or, in other words, of achieving “extreme” growth (see also 
Andrews et al. 2020). Guzman is silent on any role the market power of the acquiring firms 
might have in raising the likelihood of takeover, simply treating the greater likelihood of 
 
1 We should note here that in general – that is, not only in digital or tech - the term “start-up” is employed in a way 
which assumes scalability. One would not call a new car repair garage a start-up, except ironically or as a pun in the 
name; one would not call a new café a start-up, unless it was designed and organized with an eye on franchising. 
Although digital products are among the most scalable, we can say in general that a start-up is a new small firm seen 




financing for extreme growth as one of the benefits of agglomeration. We see the same in Kerr 
and Robert-Nicoud’s (2020) otherwise exhaustive review of the character of tech clusters, and of 
the frantic attempts of places to brand themselves as “Silicon Something”: consideration of 
market power is absent. 
There is now considerable public scrutiny2 of acquisitions by tech giants. There is also a 
growing body of research. This literature does not ignore market power, but it does ignore 
geography, location in space. “Space” needs the qualifier because the literature is full of 
references to “space”, “cluster” or “zone”, but these refer to “spaces” of products or 
technologies. 
The secular growth of market power in the US since 1980 is now widely recognized  (De 
Loecker and Eeckhout 2017; Eggertsson, Robbins, and Wold 2018; Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg 
2019), and has been particularly great in digital sectors (Calligaris, Criscuolo, and Marcolin 
2018). It is an era which dawned with the de-regulation of old network industries, and singularly 
failed to come to terms with the opportunities for market power presented by proprietary digital 
platforms. The market power of giant technology firms has become, belatedly, a matter of 
concern for, among others, the US Congress (anti-trust hearings), the government of Australia 
(clamping down on Google and Facebook’s free-riding on newspapers), the DG Competition of 
the European Commission (new proposal for the Digital Market Act) and legislators in states like 
North Dakota (taking aim at Google and Apple’s monopsonies on apps using their respective 
phone platforms). Meanwhile, a handful of Silicon Valley and Seattle companies operating 
digital platforms have far and away the highest market valuations of any corporations on Earth. 
Platforms connect users as a network. Networks benefit from increasing returns, which 
creates economies of scale and results in lock-in as a source of their advantage (Kenney and 
Zysman 2016; Rikap 2020). Our Big Tech companies control particularly large platforms, and 
often control more than one network (Ducci 2020; Stallkamp and Schotter 2021). For example, 
Alphabet and Apple both control phone operating systems, which are platforms for apps – most 
phone apps in the world go through the online “stores” of these two companies; Adobe, 
Microsoft and Oracle all sell general purpose software which produces user files in proprietary 
 







formats, making users dependent on the platform in order to ensure full inter-operability; 
Alphabet and Facebook dominate online advertising in much of the world; Amazon’s 
“marketplace” connects hundreds of thousands of vendors with hundreds of millions of 
customers; Facebook and Microsoft operate social media platforms; and so on.  
Digital platform business models serve networks, but they are unlike the relatively static 
networks of the 19th and 20th centuries. Owners of an electric power grid, once it is in place, have 
little to fear from competitors; for a digital platform, maintaining market position, and 
monetizing that position, demand ongoing innovation, refinement of features, addition of 
services (Hindman 2018). The major platforms have considerable internal research capabilities 
but, compared with the industrial giants of the previous century – General Electric, IBM, and 
such – they source more innovation through acquisition (Lazonick 2009; Rikap and Lundvall 
2020). And, because of the financial resources which their market power confers, the major 
platforms are always in a position to acquire. 
Gautier and Lamesch (2020) review five tech giants’ (Google, Amazon, Facebook, 
Amazon and Microsoft, or GAFAM) acquisitions during 2015-17. They find that acquisitions 
mostly fall in the firms’ core markets segments or product spaces. Similarly, Argentesi, 
Buccirossi, Calvano, Duso, Marrazzo and Nava (2019), in a study of acquisitions by Amazon, 
Facebook and Google (AFG) in the decade 2008-2018, conclude that acquired products and 
services are largely complementary to those already supplied by the three companies. This is 
supported by Lopez Giron and Vialle (2017) in their study of Microsoft’s acquisitions in the 
period 1992-2016, focussing on acquired resources and competences: the largest share of 
acquisitions complements (rather than diversifies) Microsoft’s core businesses. Gautier and 
Lamesch (2020) find that most of the acquired products are discontinued post-acquisition, 
implying that the acquisitions are largely motivated to gain intangible assets such as intellectual 
property rights and talent.   
 This pattern of acquisitions has implications for innovation. Bryan and Hovenkamp 
(2020) find that start-ups which aim to be acquired are biased toward inventions that improve the 
leader’s technology, rather than offering an alternative to it.  
Tech giants may acquire companies to suppress competition. This is well documented in 
other information-based sectors, such as pharma and microprocessors (Feldman et al. 2020). 




between 5.3% and 7.4% of US acquisitions between 1989 and 2010 were “acquire to kill”, and 
thus harmful for both innovation and competition.  
Moreover, even without any deliberate suppression of a competing product, a tech giant’s 
acquisition or development of a product tends to create a “kill zone”, in which competing 
projects struggle to get both users and capital (Kamepalli, Rajan, and Zingales 2020). Rival start-
ups offering substitutes for an acquired product find themselves starved of both capital and 
customers; notice that this describes a winner-take-all market, in which the winner is the first to 
be acquired by a tech giant. Wen and Zhu (2019) find that when Google appears likely to 
develop a new app or capability for Android internally, its smaller competitors reduce innovation 
and raise prices. 
Argentesi et al. (2019), Bryan and Hovenkamp (2020), and Kamepalli, Rajan and 
Zingales (2020), Motta and Peitz (2020), Katz (2020) and Cabral (2020) all draw conclusions 
about implications for competition and innovation policies. Abstracting from the considerable 
differences in methods and disciplines there are common themes. One is the deleterious effect 
platform acquisitions can have on innovation. Another is the fact that the vast majority of 
acquisitions by platform-based tech giants evades investigation, often because the turnover of the 
acquired digital start-ups falls below the threshold required to trigger government intervention. 
The consensus is that legal restraints on merger activity are not doing the job, and that tightening 
these restrictions could improve both innovation and competition. Kamepalli, Rajan and Zingales 
(2020) stress, however, that more effective measures would be ones which directly attack the 
exclusivity of platforms: open standards; controls on data ownership; and – for countries outside 
the US – restrictions on global, US-based platforms to make room for national alternatives 
(policies in China and India are offered as examples here). 
Acquisition is usually a financially desirable outcome for the shareholders of a small 
firm; for firms in the winner-take-all digital platform economy, it may be the only route to 
survival. The home bases of the platform giants are geographically concentrated: the seven Big 
Tech we study are located in just two metropolitan areas, San Francisco-San Jose (the Silicon 
Valley), and Seattle. If physical proximity to the acquirer makes a successful acquisition more 
likely, this provides a motivation for start-ups to move to a major tech hub, and to the Silicon 
Valley in particular. This centripetal pull of the tech clusters for precisely those start-ups which 




development initiatives based on developing digital technologies: the product may be weightless, 
but the market for the company is elsewhere.  
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis 
Our empirical investigation relies on all acquisitions made in the US by the seven largest 
digital platforms in terms of market capitalization3: Alphabet (Google), Adobe, Apple, 
Facebook, and Oracle headquartered in Silicon Valley, Amazon and Microsoft located in Seattle, 
from their inception to the current time.4 In choosing these firms we are excluding a number of 
neighboring categories: non-US platforms (China has at least two that would qualify on the basis 
of market valuation, Alibaba and Tencent Holdings); payment platforms (had we included 
American payment platforms with market valuations in the neighborhood of the companies that 
we did include, it would have changed the geographical picture little, with two in the Silicon 
Valley (Visa and PayPal), and one in New York (Mastercard)); hardware (the standards of Intel 
or Nvidia can be regarded as platforms); telecommunications (mobile phone networks); and 
entertainment (Netflix, for instance, is a digital platform).  
Each of our seven firms began as an entrepreneurial start-up. Most received venture 
capital financing (Oracle leveraged federal procurement contracts), grew rapidly, and went 
public. The phenomenal growth of these firms, together with that of hundreds of smaller digital 
platform companies, contributed to the belief that “tech”, specifically, digital technology, offers 
an attractive building block for local economic development.   
Table 1 provides an accounting of acquisitions, by acquiring company, from their earliest 
acquisition through 2020. We include all full (100%) acquisitions made by Big Tech and their 
subsidiaries. Data are drawn from three databases, Zephyr-Bureau van Dijk, Capital IQ-S&P and 
SDC Platinum-Refinitiv, and then cross-checked and verified through manual searches. 
Acquisitions which cannot be verified through either mention on the company website or news 
articles are not included in our sample on the assumption that these are likely “acqui-hires” with 
no substantial start-up company involved. The Appendix details the laborious procedure used to 
construct this list, and shows statistics for the various data sources.   
 
3 As of 30 April 2020. 




In total, the seven Big Tech acquired 940 firms worldwide, with 674 acquisitions based in 
the US. Notably, all of the tech giant firms started acquiring of other firms in the years following 
their own IPO. Alphabet completed the largest number of acquisitions to date (237), closely 
followed by Microsoft (235).  Acquisitions occur consistently over time, with the annual average 
number of acquisitions ranging from 12 a year for Alphabet, to two for Adobe.  
[Table 1 about here] 
For all of the Big Tech, the majority of acquisitions were sourced from the United States;  
266 (28%) were acquisitions of firms based outside the US (Table 2). The largest number of 
acquisitions are from the UK (50), Canada (42) and Israel (32). Acquisitions within countries are 
also geographically concentrated. This pattern broadly reflects the distribution of major high tech 
clusters, and their linguistic and political affinities with the United States, identified in Arora and 
Gambardella (2005). However, out of all of Asia and the developing world the only country with 
more than two of the takeover targets was India (6) while China, Japan and Korea – all major 
locations for digital technology – are under-represented.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Caution is required in comparing countries. “Acquiring a company” does not mean the 
same thing everywhere; in some countries it comes with much greater obligations to employees 
and other stakeholders, than it does in others (Hall and Soskice 2001). The tax implications may 
also differ. The Big Tech acquisitions are largely about acquiring skilled employees and 
intangible assets, rather than operations and physical assets. Hiring the employees, or purchasing 
the intangible assets, can be alternatives to acquiring the firm as a whole, and differences in 
national institutions may weigh in the choice. 
This caution does not, however, hinder within-country comparisons. In most countries for 
which the numbers are large enough to generalize, we see an overwhelming concentration in the 
country’s financial capital – London, Tel Aviv, Paris, Stockholm, Dublin; however, in Canada 
and Germany – both federal, polycentric states – the pattern is more geographically dispersed.  
We limit our further analysis to the acquisition targets with known locations in the United 
States for the two decades 2001-2020.5 Table 3 gives a breakdown of the Big Tech acquisitions 
by metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and the percentage that received venture capital 
investment. Investor (vendor, to Zephyr) data are from Zephyr and includes the majority owners 
 




at the time of acquisition, which are similar to the ownership information that would be provided 
in an IPO prospectus: reliable data are only available after 2001. While VC is the largest source 
of financing, businesses’ founders, angel investors and other entities such as banks, and wealth 
and investment management firms were mentioned. There was only one public-private equity 
investment from the New York City Investment Fund LLC, now known as Partnership Fund for 
NYC. Individual investors include founders and angel investors. Two universities were listed: 
Stanford (in the Silicon Valley) and the University of Washington (in Seattle).  
Of the 603 US acquisitions about half of them received venture capital investment. For 
non-US acquisitions only one quarter received venture capital investment. Note the extreme 
concentration in the Silicon Valley, which we define as the combined San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa 
Clara and San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley MSAs. The largest number of firms (291 or almost 
half of the US Big Tech acquisitions) were located in Silicon Valley at the time of acquisition, 
with 54% of the companies receiving VC investment. Four other MSAs form a distinct second 
tier for acquisitions: New York, the financial capital of the US; Boston and Los Angeles, both of 
which are important centers of both technology and private equity finance; and Seattle, the home 
of Microsoft and Amazon. In all, there were 18 cities with two to five acquisitions. There were 
25 MSA’s with one acquisition each and one third of these companies received VC investment. 
Overall, 49% of the acquired companies received VC investment: the percentage is slightly 
higher, among the main hubs, in Silicon Valley, New York and Boston.   
[Table 3 about here] 
We compare the spatial distribution of Big Tech acquisition targets to the distribution of 
four different sets of firms seeking finance in relevant industries.  
Three-quarters of the seven Big Tech acquisitions are attribute to three SIC codes: 7371 – 
computer programming services, 7372 – prepacked software, and 7374 – computer processing 
and data preparation and processing services. The remainder of the acquisitions were dispersed 
across many sectors. Our four comparison groups are limited to these three SICs, using the 
sources and definitions described in Table 4.    
[Table 4 about here] 
The broadest of the four comparison samples consists of 6,213 firms in the three SIC 
codes that received Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) loan guarantees. This is a 




demonstrated their credit worthiness. A narrower sample consists of the 3,005 firms listed in the 
Zephyr database as having been fully acquired, but with a purchaser other than one of our seven 
Big Tech (All Other Acquisitions). The narrowest sample consists of the 196 firms which had 
Nasdaq IPOs, Nasdaq being the leading exchange for tech company stocks (IPOs). Finally, we 
also compare with a subset of the All Other Acquisitions sample: 1,030 firms sold by VC firms 
which also sold firms to Big Tech.  Just as the map of international Big Tech acquisitions is not 
the global map of digital technology, neither is the US acquisitions map the same as the map of 
the sectors involved.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 examines the geographic distribution of the comparison data sets. Silicon Valley 
has the highest count of firms for all the categories except SBA loans, which has a larger 
geographic reach. Firms that receive SBA loans have the human capital and organizational 
capabilities required to establish start-ups in these industries and are widely geographically 
distributed. Indeed, the counts of firms applying for SBA loans encompass a much larger set of 
cities and suggests that public financing may be an alternative substitute when VC funding is not 
available. New York City, the largest metropolitan area is more heavily represented by SBA 
loans.  
 [Table 5 about here] 
The maps in Figure 1 show the distribution of the first three comparison groups, and their 
number relative to Big Tech acquisition targets. The size of circles indicates the number of firms 
in the comparison group, while the shading indicates the number of Big Tech acquisitions 
relative to that. Circles in the darkest shade of red indicate that there were a larger number of Big 
Tech acquisitions in that place than companies in the comparison group. Empty (white) circles 
indicate an MSA with cases from the relevant comparison group but no Big Tech targets. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The top panel shows the distribution of firms from the selected tech industries that 
received SBA 7(a) loans. Most large cities had a substantial number of SBA loan recipients but 
small places also have firms that received these loans. This does not mean that the latter are 
evenly geographically distributed: cities known to be tech hubs had a larger share, as we would 
expect. In most MSAs, the number of Big Tech acquisitions is less than 25% of the number of 




secondary tech hubs (the most substantial being Boulder, Colorado), and the Silicon Valley, 
where the number of Big Tech acquisitions exceeds the number of SBA loans.  
The comparison group for the second map is all other acquisitions of firms in relevant 
industries. An acquisition is a relatively rare event, so there are overall fewer circles than in the 
SBA case. Compared with SBA loans, acquisitions are more concentrated on the West Coast and 
in the Northeast; still, they remain far more widely distributed than Big Tech acquisitions. Of 
large cities, the ones with the higher ratios of Big Tech acquisitions to other acquisitions are all 
on the West Coast: Seattle, Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, San Diego.  
The third map compares Nasdaq IPOs. In most locations that have IPOs, there are only a 
few, and the number of Big Tech acquisitions is at a comparable, or even higher level. 
Finally, we compare the growth in geographical concentration of Big Tech Acquisition to 
that observed in the four comparison samples, using the share of targets located in Silicon Valley 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index by MSA (Figure 2). The extent and increase in 
concentration of tech giants’ targets is striking. In the first period, other businesses sold by 
investors that sold to Big Tech were actually more concentrated on both measures. However, this 
changed by 2011-2020, where almost 30% of Big Tech US-based targets were located in the 
Silicon Valley, compared to less than 10% of all acquisition targets in the relevant industries.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
4. Differential Outcomes: Probit Analysis   
We estimate probit models to provide additional descriptive analysis. Table 6 presents 
definitions for the variables we use in our regression along with summary statistics.    
[Table 6 about here] 
How are the odds of being acquired by a Big Tech affected by the location of the 
acquired firm? If being acquired is an objective for a start-up and if location affects the 
likelihood of being acquired, this would be a factor in drawing such firms to certain locations, 
above and beyond any productivity advantages. Moreover, the digital tech sector is not 
homogeneous; an acquisition is the outcome of a matching process. Some start-ups have 
products, intangible assets or personnel that offer better potential matches than others for our 
tech giant firms, and for that reason would be more likely to locate in a place which makes 




The likelihood of being acquired by Big Tech may also be affected by the source of 
external financing in the first stage, however. Proximity to venture capital, in particular, is often 
claimed as an advantage to locating in the Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994; Kenney and Florida 
2000; but see Lerner 2009). A variant of this claim stresses the role of certain specialist investors 
– most but not all of them VCs, and many but not all of them located in the Silicon Valley – 
which have strong ties to the tech giant companies dating back to the first-round financing of the 
latter: initial backing from a member of this small group may bring a start-up into the right 
networks, and improve its chance of being acquired by one of the Big Tech. These early 
investors in Big Tech are listed in the Appendix (Table A.3); they include such well-known firms 
as Venrock, Sequoia Capital, and Greylock Partners. 
Finally, it is possible, from what we have seen in our description of the data, that Big 
Tech targets are disproportionately – that is, compared with other acquisitions in the relevant 
industries – not just from the Silicon Valley, but from major digital tech clusters (e.g. Boston, 
Seattle, New York, Los Angeles) overall. To check this, and also to control for this 
agglomeration effect in our estimate of the Silicon Valley effect, we include a variable for the 
number of SBA loans in the three focal industries and in the MSA in which the target is located.   
Any of these same factors – Silicon Valley location, VC funding, the location of the VC, 
and a backer in the group of initial Big Tech funders, size of digital tech agglomeration – could 
also affect the likelihood that second stage financing will take the form of IPO rather than 
acquisition. In the IPO case we do not have strong priors on what these effects would be, but are 
interested in what the comparison will tell us. 
We estimate two sets of probit models. In the first set (Table 7), the data consists of all 
Big Tech US acquisition targets in the years 2001 to 2020, together with all other acquisition 
targets in our three focal industries. In the second set (Table 8), the data consists of firms in the 
focal industries that went to IPO, versus all acquisition targets other than the Big Tech targets. 
All models include Target in Silicon Valley (binary), SBA Loans (continuous), and a dummy for 
the year. Other variables, depending on the model, are Investor Venture Capital, Investor in 
Silicon Valley, and Investor Early Investor in Big Tech (all binary). 
We see in Table 7 that a Silicon Valley location for the target has a positive and 
statistically significant effect; with all covariates included, the marginal effect of a Silicon Valley 




acquired by a Big Tech. The investor being a venture capitalist actually makes it more likely that 
the firm will be acquired by a non-Big Tech firm; in contrast to the target’s location, the 
investor’s location in the Silicon Valley has no discernable effect on whether the acquirer is a 
Big Tech. On the other hand, the investor being an early backer of one of the Big Tech 
companies has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a Big Tech 
matchup; with a marginal effect of 0.16, it is essentially the same as the effect of a Silicon Valley 
location for the target.  
SBA loan numbers have a positive and statistically significant effect, indicating that in 
MSAs with fewer digital tech SMEs the ratio of Big Tech acquisitions to acquisitions by other 
firms is lower. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 considers the same factors for the IPO outcome. Again, we see a strong positive 
effect from Silicon Valley location – at 0.19, about the same as for Big Tech acquisitions. If an 
IPO is the big prize for founders of a start-up – the attraction of growing while staying 
independent – this suggests one more attraction of the Silicon Valley. Having a venture capitalist 
for an investor has (again) a negative effect; having an investor located in the Silicon Valley is 
now significantly negative; having an investor who was one of the early Big Tech backers has a 
statistically insignificant effect after controlling for other variables. As with Big Tech 
acquisitions, more SBA loans – which is to say, greater size of the digital tech agglomeration in 
the MSA where the target is located – raises the likelihood that second round financing will 
come in the form of an IPO rather than acquisition.  
[Table 8 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
The conditions which link digital platform monopoly and the pull of start-ups to the 
major tech hubs, may be summarized as follows. Digital products are scalable; some can be 
scaled as platforms, which connect users as a network, creating lock in. For the platform giants 
this has been the basis for monopoly power. The monopoly power of the Big Tech (as for other 
giants, in other IPR-, network-based industries) is never secure. They are Schumpeterian 
(Schumpeter 1942), innovating to maintain and extend their market power. However, unlike the 




essentially outsourced to start-ups, which the Big Tech may then choose to acquire. The latter 
compete in a sort of tournament in which being acquired is the prize. The tech giants have vast 
financial resources, putting them in a position to make an offer for any smaller firm they might 
find useful. 
Many who start new firms might prefer independence, rather than being acquired. Digital 
start-ups are, however, producing something which is scalable, with very low marginal costs. 
This puts them in a winner-take-all market, where the first mover into a particular platform 
function or a new technical standard can have an overwhelming advantage. Start-ups thus require 
infusions of equity, which we can think of as coming in two phases. It is common, in the first 
stage, for this to come from investors who expect to sell the company on if its product proves 
successful. The second stage is either and IPO or acquisition by a larger company. We regard 
either of these second stage outcomes as infusions of capital for the start-up, though in the 
acquisition case the start-up may lose its identity altogether. From the standpoint of shareholders 
in the start-up, completion of the second phase represents success. 
For the start-up, there is no certainty in this path to being acquired: even if the start-up’s 
product (“product” here might be a new platform, but it can also simply be some IPR, or a team’s 
demonstrated ability to solve a particular kind of problem) is a good one, another start-up may 
have something similar, or the large firm may develop something internally. Start-ups will 
therefore be motivated to position themselves ways that improve the likelihood of being 
acquired. 
Is moving to Silicon Valley one of those ways? Although our seven Big Tech do acquire 
firms throughout the US and in many other countries, some places see far more than their share 
of acquisitions. Certain foreign countries (Canada, UK, Israel), certain foreign cities (London, 
Paris, Bangalore, Tel Aviv), certain cities in the US (New York, Boston, Seattle, Los Angeles) 
and, far above even those, the Silicon Valley itself. Within the US, we are able to compare this 
with the distribution of all acquisitions, and with the distribution of SBA loans, in the relevant 
industries. By both measures, Big Tech acquisitions lean far more heavily to the major tech 
clusters and, again, far far more to the Silicon Valley. Big Tech may be able to source its 





To what extent are these acquisitions driven by the market power of Big Tech? Market 
power gives Big Tech the means, in the form of piles of cash. It also gives Big Tech the motive: 
just as Schumpeter described, the monopoly is maintained, extended and renewed through 
innovation – albeit, now, innovation is to a large extent initiated outside the monopoly firms 
themselves. 
Actions on both sides of acquisition transaction – the need for the start-up to scale up, 
and the means and motive of Big Tech – grow out of the proprietary control of access points to 
digital networks. 
The problem of network monopoly has been faced before. In the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, for instance, then-new network industries such as electric power, telephones and 
railways developed huge power, and were subsequently brought either under public ownership, 
or public regulation, almost everywhere in the world. The various modes of regulation are 
beyond the scope of this paper – suffice it to say that in technical terms this is not an unknown 
problem. In political terms it is perhaps a bigger problem than that faced with the old network 
industries, because the geography of digital platforms is different. An electric power network or 
a railway has assets and employees distributed around the limited territory it serves; those who 
are harmed by the monopoly are in roughly the same place as the monopoly’s assets and 
employees, which makes the regulation of the monopoly a distributional matter within a well-
defined polity. Twentieth century American regulation of public utilities and banks actually 
enforced this by keeping the companies within state lines. 
The geography of a digital platform firm is much different, and that different geography 
makes for a different politics of regulation. The platform firm typically has assets and 
employment concentrated in a few locations. For those locations, it is an important export 
industry – that is precisely why state and local governments seek to foster tech clusters. Big 
platform firms exercise market power nationally in the United States, and internationally. Within 
the US, the economic interests of the major tech clusters are in conflict with those of the places 
left behind; internationally, the maintenance of Big Tech’s monopolies has become a central 
pillar of US trade policy (Guy 2007; Rodrik 2018).  
Should this situation change – following, perhaps, the sorts of measures outlined by 
Kamepalli et al. (2020) – the consequent decline in the acquisition market should make it more 




remove one factor which drives the seemingly endless growth in size and housing costs in the 
major technology clusters. 
What we have observed here, in the case of seven large digital platform companies, raises 
a bigger question about the geography of market power and of acquisitions. What goes for digital 
platforms may, or may not, go for other types of information-based product with extreme 
increasing returns and wide geographical reach, such as pharma, biotech, and digital media. 
Moreover, with digital platforms and with others, how much of the acquisition market is held by 
giant firms, as opposed to merely large? In the first instance, both questions could be addressed 
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The dataset used in this paper draws on several sources. Quantitative analysis relies on data from Zephyr, 
Capital IQ and SDC Platinum databases. All of these provide data on mergers and acquisitions and were 
searched for acquisitions by the seven Big Tech. Additionally, we built a bespoke dataset to gain more 
information about the acquisitions. We limit the dataset to 100% acquisitions only, and include acquisitions 
by subsidiaries of Big Tech. We combine different data sources to confirm information and fill in data gaps. 
While some tech giants, such as Microsoft and Oracle tend to announce acquisitions through press releases 
and maintain lists of acquisitions on their websites, others such as Facebook, Alphabet and Apple keep a 
veil of secrecy around their M&A activity, leaving also commercial databases with limited information to 
draw on, unless transactions require formal public disclosure. 
As information on the commercial databases is sometimes missing or imprecise, we only include businesses 
in the final database that can also be found by manual search from news sources or the companies’ own 
websites. Some businesses are taken over through “acqui-hires”, whereby the Big Tech hires the targets 
founders of its staff and may also buy its intellectual property. Instead of being formally acquired, the 
business ceases to exist. While such deals are sometimes listed as acquisitions on the commercial databases, 
these were excluded from the analysis. After confirming the full list of acquisitions, duplicates from the 
different datasets were cleaned. This was particularly challenging since many businesses trade under a 
different name, often the name of their app or product, rather than the registered business name. Finally, 
the databases were cross-checked to add any missing transactions.  
Table A.1 summarizes the reconciliation of the different datasets. Reassuringly, a large number of 
acquisitions can be found on all four datasets. In total, we record 940 distinct transactions both in the US 
and elsewhere in the world.  
 
Table A.1: Match results 
Zephyr & CapIQ & SDC & manual search 376 
CapIQ & SDC & manual search 176 
Zephyr & CapIQ & manual search 130 
CapIQ & manual search 111 
SDC & manual search 66 
Manual search only 30 
Zephyr & SDC & manual search 27 
Zephyr & manual search 24 
Total number of businesses 940 
 
As a quality check, Table A.2 shows the share of matching attributes for businesses that can be found on 
multiple databases. Reassuringly, the values are high throughout. Note that SDC Platinum does not record 




explained by differences in spelling. The same goes for the subnational level, as different databases use 
different levels of geographical breakdown outside the US. Some of the differences occur also because of 
missing data.  
 
Table A.2: Reconciling information across Zephyr, Capital IQ and SDC Platinum 
 
3 matching values 2 matching values 
City - 68% 
Country 97% 99% 
Year of incorporation - 44% 
Region 92% 85% 
SIC code 73% 87% 
Subsidiary - 80% 
Acquisition year 95% 98% 
Note: Share of matched firms, where also the listed attributes match across databases.  
 
Figure A.1 shows the number of acquisitions per year. All of the Big Tech were active in the acquisition 
market almost from the start, albeit to varying extent. Alphabet made the most acquisitions overall, with 
increased activity from 2010. Both Amazon and Apple have become more active recently. Microsoft and 
Oracle had periods of growing and declining activity. Adobe did not make as many acquisitions as the 
others but maintained a constant level of activity throughout.  
 






We also consider the vendors that sold startups to Big Tech. Often, these are early investors such as venture 
capitalists, but sometimes they are also the businesses’ founders. This information is only available from 
Zephyr. The investor is not known for every acquisition – in 13% of deals they are not. This is a particularly 
the case for earlier transactions, as Figure A.2 shows.  
 







Lists compiling historical M&A for each of the Big Tech were found on Wikipedia, techwyse.com and 
cbinsights.com and used as a starting point for research. Information on company websites about acquisition 
activity was also used when available. Crunchbase and Pitchbook databases were used to gather information 
about the original geographic location of the acquired companies, date of acquisition, value of transaction 
if available, and history of venture capital backing if applicable. Internet research was conducted to learn 
more about each individual acquisition. Details about the talent, technology, and intellectual property that 
was acquired and plans for the future of each acquired company including integrating it into the acquiring 
company were specific interests. Sources including the New York Times, Washington Post, The Wall Street 
Journal, Business Insider, Reuters, and Techcrunch were preferred and used when available. News articles 
on other sites including Forbes, Fortune, cnet.com, zdnet.com, CNBC, and Venturebeat were used to gather 
information as well.  
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